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n financial circles, rogues abound. Rogues include not only promot-
ers and sellers of securities but, with some frequency, bankers, attor-
neys, accountants, investment bankers, appraisers, business
consultants, tax consultants, financial planners, celebrity spokespersons,
and others who assist promoters of various (and nefarious) schemes.
Gullible citizens lose hundreds of millions of dollars each year in fraudu-
lent pie-in-the-sky deals. Since enterprises in which investors have con-
tributed funds often become judgment proof, investors seek to recover
their funds from any rogues involved on the periphery, more euphemisti-
cally termed the "collateral participants" in a securities transaction.'
The capstone of investor protections ex ante, and of means of investor
recovery ex post, has always been the federal securities laws, most specifi-
cally the Securities Act of 19332 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.3 In individual and class actions, investors have been able to recoup
significant portions of their losses, most frequently under the aegis of the
federal securities laws.
During the early 1990s, a shorter term phenomenon was overlaid on all
of this. In an era reminiscent of the old "strike suit" days, many newly
public companies, particularly high tech companies, were being sued by
class action lawyers resident in a few cities around the country.4 In "stock
1. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under the Securities
Laws-Charting the Proper Course, 65 OR. L. REV. 327, 329-30 (1986) (collateral partici-
pant defined); Douglas M. Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities
Laws, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1027, 1027 (1992) (collateral participant defined).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1994).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-11 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Andrew E. Serwer, What to Do About Legal Blackmail, FORTUNE, Nov.
1993, at 136 (profiling law firms Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach and Chimicles,
Burt & Jacobsen); Jill Abramson & Amy Stevens, Class-Action Clash: King of 'Strike
Suits' Finds Style Cramped by Legal Overhaul Bill, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 30, 1995, at Al(Milberg, Weiss represents plaintiffs in approximately one quarter of federal securities
class cases pending). Cf Richard Buck, Taking Class Action-Attorney Fights Public
Firms on Behalf of Shareholders, SEATrTLE TIMES, Dec. 19, 1994, at El (only law firm in
Seattle doing plaintiffs stock drop suits has brought approximately eight to ten cases).
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drop lawsuits," a decrease of fifteen percent or more in a corporation's
share price brought forth a multiplicity of class action lawsuits filed within
hours or days after the fall in price. 5
"Big Six" accounting firms and other professional firms were also
plagued by this phenomenon. They, too, were named as defendants in
stock drop lawsuits, based upon their roles as collateral participants in
securities offerings that later were alleged to have gone awry.6
These core groups-accountants, high tech firms, and the professionals
who represent them-lobbied for "reform" and found responsive legisla-
tors in the politicians who were acutely aware of the United States's de-
clining global competitiveness. Over a presidential veto, 7 Congress
enacted The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,8 a perma-
nent solution to the temporary phenomenon of the stock drop lawsuit. In
doing so, Congress may adequately have addressed the temporary "stock
drop lawsuit" problem, but it also severely undercut the ability of "pri-
vate attorneys general" to address the permanent problem: the presence
of rogues and the ubiquity of fraud whenever and wherever other peo-
ple's money is being sought.
To compound the matter, federal courts had already begun addressing
many of the excesses that had come to infect securities litigation. Both
the United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts had put in
place a number of gatekeeping devices that enable defense attorneys to
dismantle groundless, and some meritorious, suits under the securities
laws.9
In another article, I have described the gauntlet a federal securities law
plaintiff must now run due to the combined efforts of Congress and the
Similarly, in the 1980s, "reforms" for the law relating to derivative actions were driven
solely by events at the Fortune 500 level companies and in New York and Washington,
D.C., while, in the remainder of the country, it could be postulated that a completely differ-
ent set of conditions prevailed in corporate litigation. See Douglas M. Branson, The Amer-
ican Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance and the Derivative Action: A View
from the Other Side, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 399, 400 (1986) ("all corporate litigation
does not involve a Harry Lewis and originate in the Wilmington-Philadelphia axis").
5. Compare Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor
Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission's Authority," 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 443 (1994) (recounting congressional
testimony that a 10% drop will result in lawsuits) with Baruch Lev, Disclosure and Litiga-
tion, 37 CAL. MGMT. J. 7, 8-9 (1995) (selecting 20% drop as relevant figure for statistical
analysis of suits).
6. The coalition lobbying for the legislation amassed an early $12 million war chest,
mostly from the accounting profession. See Dodd, Domenici Introduce Securities Litigation
Reform Measure, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 440 (Mar. 25, 1994).
7. See Clinton Vetoes Sweeping Reform Bill, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1955
(Dec. 22, 1995).
8. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) [hereinafter Reform Act].
9. See, e.g., The Fourth Annual Fritz B. Burns Lecture, Central Bank: The Methodol-
ogy, the Message and the Future, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1 (1995); Donald C. Langevoort,
Disclosures That "Bespeak Caution," 49 Bus. LAW. 481 (1994); Margaret V. Sachs, Free-
dom of Contract. The Trojan Horse of Rule 10b-5. 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879 (1994).
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federal courts.10 I will not replicate that effort, which proved to be daunt-
ing. The question this Article asks is rather, after "reform, what is left?"
A subsidiary goal is to support the proposition that rogues do exist, re-
main plentiful, often wear the cloak of the professional, and are, more
than ever, difficult to bring to ground.
Thus, Part I of this Article includes some vignettes of cases in which I
participated as a consultant. These cases all involve rogue professionals
and are drawn exclusively from a distant and non-commercial comer of
the United States, the Pacific Northwest. Part I ends with a collection of
third person reports from around the country of other depredations com-
mitted by professionals in securities transactions." After setting forth
that evidence in support of the proposition that indeed "rogues abound,"
Part II then describes and analyzes some alternatives to class litigation
under the federal securities acts, means possibly to evade the numerous
obstacles recently placed astride the path to the federal courthouse.
I. TALES OF ROGUERY: A BUTCHER, A BAKER, AND A
CANDLESTICK MAKER
A. A ROGUE LAWYER
1. A Lesson in Elementary Economics: Apples and Offerings
Those experienced in the ways of commodities businesses, or those fa-
miliar with economic theory, are wary of upward trending prices for the
commodity. They know that, as prices rise to new peaks, valleys are cer-
tain to be encountered in the future. The reason is that higher prices
bring on stream marginal capacity. Once the marginal product begins to
reach markets, supply will exceed demand. Inevitably, a trough or valley
lies ahead.12
In the late 1970s, in Washington State, apple prices were rising steadily
toward new all-time highs. Orchardists were wary, but two accountants
and an engineer from Seattle were not. The trio conceived an idea of
purchasing apple orchards in order to syndicate them to investors around
the region and perhaps other areas of the United States. The three pro-
moters usually would agree to pay the orchard owner his asking price, or
close thereto, which also would be at an historically high level, in return
for two quid pro quo. The conditions were that, first, there would be little
10. See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous
(and Now Often Fatal) Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, U. CIN. L.
REV. (1996) (forthcoming) (on file with the author).
11. Apologies to the vast majority of professionals whose hard work and high level of
honesty and integrity is unquestioned. However that may be, Oliver Wendell Holmes cau-
tioned us that when one approaches the law, and law reform proposals, one "must look at
it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences ... knowledge enables him
to predict" and "not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct ... in the vaguer
sanctions of conscience." OLIVER W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 171 (1920).
12. See, e.g., RICHARD G. LIPSEY & PETER 0. STEINER, ECONOMICS 242-43 (3d ed.
1972). The analysis assumes that barriers to entry, if any, are not significant.
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or no down payment, and, second, closing would be a number of months
following acceptance of the offer to purchase.
In turn, the temporal space from offer to closing was necessary for two
reasons: first, to subdivide the orchards into 12, 15, or 20 parcels 13 and,
second, to prepare private placement disclosure documents for and to
syndicate 12, 15, or 20 general partnership offerings of 6 to 8 units each
per orchard property.
Necessarily, the process entailed great quantities of legal work. That
was especially true when the promoters' business plan involved purchase
and syndication of three or four orchards per year at an aggregate price
of $1.5 million or so per orchard. Plats of subdivision had to be prepared
and walked through governmental agencies in remote counties of the
state. Partnership agreements and management contracts had to be
drafted. Last of all, state and federal securities law compliance had to be
assured.
2. Enter the Rogue Lawyer
The promoter accountants were cost conscious when it came to dis-
bursing money for professional services. They solicited bids for rendition
of professional services. The rogue lawyer was the low bidder because he
agreed to teach the promoters how to do the securities work "in house"
in return for a promise that his firm would receive all the remaining legal
work generated by the acquisition and syndication process.
With agreement struck, the lawyer prepared the initial private place-
ment memorandum, made the necessary filings with the state securities
division, and ensured compliance with SEC Regulation D. He did no due
diligence, accepting, for example, at face value the promoters' projections
that apple prices would continue to rise and that, under their stewardship,
the quantity produced would increase as well. The double barrelled ef-
fect of rising prices and quantity assured investors that, beyond the initial
payment by investors, the cash flow from the orchard would cover all the
payments to creditors, including the retired orchardist holding a real es-
tate contract. The projections actually showed investors receiving distri-
butions from a positive, and then a cascading, cash flow in years three,
four, and beyond.
On the second orchard offering, a promoter cut and pasted documents
from the first offering. The rogue lawyer then red lined that product,
later meeting with the client several times to teach him how to do the
securities work in house. On subsequent offerings, the promoters merely
copied the rogue lawyer on the offering document, filing the document if
they heard no comment from him.
At that point, nothing may have reached an objectionable stage. The
securities lawyer generally quarterbacks the due diligence effort, but it is
13. Cf. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (subdivision of orange groves
into rows for sale to individuals rather than to partnerships).
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the client's ultimate responsibility. Many securities lawyers have been
beseeched by clients who are repeat syndicators to let them do some or
all of the securities work. As a self-preservation matter, most lawyers
agree it would be foolish for a securities lawyer to accede to such a client
request. Yet nothing prohibits a securities lawyer and a repeat syndicator
from "job sharing" securities work.
But, in the case sub justice, after a handful of offerings, the state securi-
ties regulators began asking a few routine questions. 14 Immediately upon
receiving the written inquiry, the promoters forwarded the letter to the
rogue lawyer. The lawyer would then reply, writing to the regulator
under the letterhead of his well-regarded law firm. "This office repre-
sents these promoters in connection with the Chief Joseph Orchard," he
would write. Literally, the statement was true. But in context the state-
ment was intended to put the state regulator off the scent. The tactic
worked. The regulator undoubtedly assumed that a reputable law firm
was involved and was doing the securities work, and hence, his inquiry
should be reassigned as a lower priority.
The syndications were a great success. School teachers, police officers,
railroad conductors, truck drivers, and many other ordinary persons
bought the securities. What could be more American, more solid, than a
$25,000 investment in a Washington State apple orchard, especially with
the promise of Japanese and other world markets ever opening to the
product? The promoters syndicated approximately eighteen orchards
over four years, raised over $25 million, and, over and above the 12%-
14% syndication fees, enjoyed management fee income of $350,000 each
per year.
3. The Beginning of the End
Accountants are usually not pomologists, though. Therefore, the pro-
moters had to pay additional fees to hire managers who actually knew
something about apple orchards. In turn, those managers did not relish
dirtying their hands. They installed yet another layer of managers who
would live on the properties. Those on-site managers would then hire
workers to prune, fertilize, and harvest. What had been a roller coaster
commodities business, in down times barely able to support the orchard-
ist who did much of the work himself, now had three or four layers of
new "management" that the promoters had installed. Then, as could
have been predicted, prices fell. The double barrel effect worked in re-
verse: prices fell, and, due to inept management, quantity of output de-
creased as well.
14. The regulator inquired whether or not the multiple offerings were part of a single
overall plan of financing. The question, then, called for the issuer, or its attorney, to show
cause why the offerings, otherwise exempt, should not be "integrated." See, e.g., Prelimi-
nary Note 6 to SEC Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1996) ("[R]egulation D is not
available to any issuer for any transaction or chain of transactions that, although in techni-
cal compliance with these rules, is part of a plan or scheme to evade the registration provi-
sions of the Act."). State regulators apply the same standard as the SEC does.
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Out went the call to partners for additional cash contributions. Be-
cause the entities were general partnerships, investors were liable for the
debts of the partnership. On a $25,000 investment, many investors paid
an additional $35,000 to $40,000 before they said "no more" and con-
sulted counsel.
The rogue lawyer assisted in oiling any squeaky wheels. He proposed
and prepared documents for a "roll up" partnership whose business plan
stated that its purpose was to purchase interests in "various orchard
properties" in the Pacific Northwest. Left unstated was precisely whose
interests those would be. They would be the interests of any prior inves-
tor who had complained and who had also gone to the trouble of retain-
ing counsel. The roll up entity allowed the "squeaky wheel" investor to
be paid back nearly all of her investment. In that way, the end of the
scheme was prolonged for an additional year or more.
Then the orchard venture screamed to a halt. Investors stopped paying
additional contributions. They began to network, eventually banding to-
gether to hire litigation counsel. Meanwhile, the rogue lawyer traveled to
Holiday Inn meetings in cities in which investors lived, aiding in the ha-
rangue designed to provoke payment of further assessments.
The retired orchardists foreclosed on the properties. Two promoters
declared bankruptcy; the third absconded with funds. The investors
brought an action in the federal district court for the Eastern District of
Washington against the rogue lawyer, two banks who had aided in keep-
ing the scheme afloat, and the accountants who had "compiled" the
projections.15
The lawyer was a rogue. He turned a blind eye toward disclosures he
knew to be reckless or, in the exercise of a minimum of care, would have
known to be false. He actively assisted in creating a false impression in
regulators' minds that a reputable law firm had done the securities work
in the various offerings. 16 In return, for doing the "other" legal work, his
law firm received $400,000 or so in fees over four years. In the securities
work he did do, he did not perform up to what should be "the minimum
engagement," which is to help the client comply with an exemption. It is
not, and cannot be considered to be, merely the scrivener of a disclosure
document with pie-in-the-sky projections.
15. Anderson v. Thompson, 144 F.R.D. 393 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
16. See, e.g., Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws,
supra note 1, at 1036-37 (footnotes omitted):
The attorney who because of ignorance of securities law, or perhaps more
likely a desire to get or retain the client's other legal business, turns a blind
eye to a registration or a disclosure violation, is as culpable as one who over-
performs. An appraiser who gives a high appraisal based upon incomplete
analysis and labels it "for client's eyes only," knowing full well that the docu-
ment will be a keystone in selling a deal, under-performs but seems culpable.
The accountant who prepares track record data for a repeat syndicator or an
investment advisor, knowing it to be puffed considerably, but labels it a




4. Commencement of Litigation
Yet it was difficult to bring the rogue to ground. The judge dismissed
fifteen or so counts, holding that general partnership interests are not
securities.17 He declined to exercise pendant jurisdiction over state law
claims such as breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty, and violations of state securities laws.
After protracted discovery, the case went to trial only as a RICO con-
spiracy case. The predicate acts were fraud violations in the three syndi-
cations that took the corporate form. The attorney was alleged to have
participated in and aided and abetted the fraud violations. After a four
month trial, the jury returned a RICO conspiracy verdict but found the
conspiracy to have been formed only very late in the game, around 1983,
rather than 1980. As a result, the verdict, $1.6 million plus attorneys'
fees, was small in comparison to investors' losses.
The plaintiffs' attorneys refiled the pendant claims in state court in
Montana. They commenced additional discovery. The case proceeded to
a few months shy of trial when a settlement returned to investors most of
their investment but without the 7, 8, or 9 years of interest they had
foregone.
5. The Safe Harbor for Projections of Future Economic Performance
and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine
The case was difficult, but under the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act (the "Act") and recent judicial developments, the case would
have been impossible. The misleading projections would not be actiona-
ble. The rogue lawyer knew enough to plaster his disclosure documents
with disclaimers and cautionary language ("there can be no assurance
that a, b, c, d, e, etc. will occur" or "that the sun will ever shine again" or
"that rain will ever fall in the Pacific Northwest"). The Act provides that
with respect to public companies and initial public offerings, if disclosures
have appended to them sufficient cautionary language, 18 the judge must
grant any dispositive motion presented as to those misleading disclosures
or omissions.' 9 In exempt offerings, the same result is now reached by
means of the judicially evolved "bespeaks caution" doctrine.20
17. Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 728-30 (9th Cir. 1988) (standard general partnership
interests are not securities). The Ninth Circuit later reversed itself. See Koch v. Hankins,
928 F.2d 1471, 1478 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying the principles of Hocking v. DuBois, 885 F.2d
1449, 1457, 1460 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1078 (1990)). Other circuits as well
had found standard general partnership interests not to be securities. See, e.g., Banghart v.
Hollywood Gen. Partnership, 902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1990) (movie production part-
nerships); Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240-42
(4th Cir. 1988) (fishing boats partnership).
18. Reform Act, supra note 8, § 102(a) (forward-looking statements "accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements").
19. Id. (no discovery is permitted and the federal judge must dismiss).
20. See generally Royce de R. Barondes, The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: Revisiting
the Application of Federal Securities Law to Opinions and Estimates, 19 J. CORP. L. 244
(1994); Langevoort, supra note 9.
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6. Elimination of Securities Fraud as a Predicate Act Under RICO
It has always been curious that securities law registration violations are
not predicate acts for RICO. A civil RICO claim, of course, raises the
prospect of treble damages and an award of attorney's fees to the prevail-
ing plaintiff.21
Securities lawyers generally regard registration violations as the more
serious sin, in part because Section 12(1) of the Securities Act provides
for strict liability in that case. 22 In egregious disclosure cases, courts have
held that delivery of a materially misleading prospectus fails to satisfy the
Act's prospectus delivery requirements. 23 In that way, attorneys have at-
tempted to bootstrap antifraud rule violations into registration violations.
Under RICO, however, the objective is the reverse. Misleading disclo-
sures and failures to disclose have been the raw material with which a
plaintiff can allege predicate acts of securities fraud.24 One allegation is
that a registration violation renders the entire offering subject to recision.
Hence, the financial statements should disclose a contingent liability.
They never do. So, in that manner, lawyers have attempted to convert a
registration violation into a disclosure or antifraud violation.
Under the new "reform" Act, however, securities fraud has been elimi-
nated as a predicate act for establishing a RICO treble damage claim.25
Federal RICO will no longer be a significant factor, or a factor at all, in
securities litigation.
7. The Demise of Aiding and Abetting Liability
As has been mentioned as an argument that "reform" legislation was
not needed, the Supreme Court has been steadily at work. The justices'
work product also would have made prosecution of the case against the
rogue lawyer more difficult.
Despite twenty-five years of court holdings that collateral participants
could be liable for aiding and abetting primary violators' violations of the
securities laws, the Court in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank26 ended
aiding and abetting liability. Central Bank also casts grave doubt about
other forms of implied secondary liability utilized in attempts to hold lia-
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994) ("recover threefold the damages he sustains and the
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee").
22. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7711 (1994).
23. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1094-96 (2d Cir. 1972).
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1994) (listing only "fraud in the sale of securities"
among the requisite predicate acts).
25. See Reform Act, supra note 8, § 107, amending 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) ("no person
may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or
sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962").
26. 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994). The Court majority ignored its own legislative re-
enactment doctrine under which later comprehensive examination and amendments of the
securities laws would constitute congressional approval of judicial developments such as
aiding and abetting. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ble collateral participants such as the rogue lawyer.27 Thus, allegations of
conspiracy or respondeat superior may not hold water.
In the case of the rogue attorney, at least toward the end, he also made
direct statements to investors or participated in statements made by
others. He may still then have been held liable under the federal securi-
ties laws, but the extent of such liability is unsettled. 28
8. An End to Expanded Seller Status Under Securities Act
Section 12(2)
A few years before Central Bank, the Court also in large part elimi-
nated another substantive basis for holding liable rogue professionals and
other collateral participants. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder29 had held that
in order to recover damages under the general antifraud rule, Rule 10b-5,
a securities plaintiff had to prove more than a mere lack of reasonable
care.30 To skirt Hochfelder and its higher state of mind requirements,
plaintiffs began to sue under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,
an antifraud provision which, through articulation of reasonable care as
an affirmative defense, grounds liability on negligence. 31
Under that section, plaintiffs often succeeded in holding collateral par-
ticipants liable under "expanded seller" and "participation" concepts. In
Pinter v. Dahl,32 the Court brought an end to "expanded seller" status.
The Court limited Section 12 liability to sellers who actually pass title or
to persons who actually solicit the purchase, motivated in part by a desire
to serve their own financial interests or those of the securities owner. The
Court further limited liability to sellers for gain, eliminating liability for
one who from a surfeit of enthusiasm or perceived friendship makes mis-
representations in convincing another to invest. In that way, Pinter
largely eliminated Section 12 as a tool for reaching great numbers of cul-
pable collateral participants in securities transactions. A later Supreme
27. See, e.g., Court Dismisses Conspiracy Claim, Citing High Court Central Bank Rul-
ing, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep, (BNA) 1439 (Sept. 15, 1995); Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifica-
tions of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal and State Securities Regulation, 70
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 501-02 (1995) (by parity of reasoning, Central Bank may also
emasculate respondeat superior liability).
28. See infra part II.A.
29. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
30. Subsequently, in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980), the Court held that in
seeking injunctive relief, the SEC also had to prove intentional or knowing conduct on the
defendant's part.
31. The section makes liable
[A]ny person who ... offers or sells a security•... by means of a prospectus
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact
... and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and
in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security.
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994).
32. 486 U.S. 622 (1988) (construing the companion registration violation liability pro-
vision, § 12(1)).
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Court decision cuts back the section's efficacy still further.33
Pinter, however, serves to illustrate what may be a widely held misun-
derstanding of professionals and their roles in securities transactions. In
the apple orchard case, the rogue lawyer may have had some Pinter liabil-
ity, for he did solicit additional capital contributions from investors. The
fact but perhaps not the extent of the liability seems clear.
9. A One-Sided and Deficient View of Rogue Professionals' Culpability
Yet the rogue lawyer's greatest culpability seems to lie in his under
performing in the case of the earlier offerings pursuant to registration
exemptions under state and federal law, or his under performing while
turning a blind eye toward wrongdoing by others.34 The Pinter Court
seems to harbor an intuitive feeling that lawyers and other professionals
should be held liable only when they become overinvolved in the wrong-
doing client's affairs-extremely overinvolved when one considers the re-
quirements that they actually have solicited or sold securities.
The Court may be correct as a matter of statutory construction but is
wrong as to the degree and kinds of culpability involved in securities
transactions. The professional who knows about wrongdoing yet who
continues to render assistance while turning a blind eye to violations of
the securities laws is much more frequent and seems just as culpable as
the one who, out of greed or enthusiasm, plays a role in the solicitation of
investors. There is and should be a minimum that comes with the terri-
tory and that minimum should include at least a duty to withdraw when a
lawyer becomes aware of wrongdoing. But Pinter, Central Bank, and the
"bespeaks caution" doctrine seem to render immune from liability many
professionals who under perform and whose culpability in so doing is a
substantial factor in causing investors' losses. 35 The blind eye has been
emblazoned on the shield wielded by the under-performing professional.
33. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995), then limited § 12(2)'s reach
to public offerings of securities, negating its use for misrepresentations in aftermarket
transactions or possibly in exempt issuer offering. Gustafson has been described as "the
most poorly-reasoned, blatantly results-driven securities opinion in recent memory." Ste-
phen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 Bus.
LAW. 1231, 1231-32 (1995).
34. In my analysis of fact patterns in state law securities cases, courts seem to find
liability in cases in which, beyond rendition of routine professional services, lawyers or
other collateral participants (1) turn a blind eye toward obvious wrongdoing by others or
(2) actively assist the wrongdoer in creating a false impression that will mislead third par-
ties such as investors or state and federal regulators. See Branson, Collateral Participant
Liability Under State Securities Laws, supra note 1, at 1060 (analyzing Oregon cases).
35. Lower federal and state courts have a similar fix, holding, for example, that law-
yers cannot be held liable if their involvement constitutes merely "daily grist for the mill,"
Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 1991), or nothing more than "the usual drafting




B. THE ROGUE ACCOUNTANT
Hanna International was a Portland, Oregon success story. The Hanna
Enterprise ("Hanna") manufactured a line of brushless commercial car
wash equipment that was ideally suited to today's high priced luxury
automobiles and the preservation of their finishes. Hanna also sold a line
of car wash products. Last of all, Hanna owned and operated a number
of car washes in cities throughout the western United States. Through
the 1970s and 1980s, the Hanna empire had recorded phenomenal
growth.
To finance that growth, in the early 1980s Hanna offered $30 million in
medium term notes to Portland, Oregon area investors. Four offerings in
four years were registered with state authorities, relying on the intrastate
exemption from registration available under the federal Securities Act.36
The offerings succeeded in the marketplace as well. Hanna promised,
and paid for a time, rates of return one and one-half to two percentage
points higher than rates available on any other investments. Even though
the return sounded too good to be true, always a sign of a Ponzi scheme, 37
the offerings were fully subscribed.
In fact, the notes' terms were too good to be true. The proceeds of
later note offerings were being utilized to pay the interest on early offer-
ings and bank borrowings. For its last few years, the Hanna car wash
empire was running on the fumes in its tank provided by the note offer-
ings. Suddenly, the Hanna empire collapsed, entering bankruptcy.
In the subsequent class action suit brought on behalf of note holders,
many of whom were retired on fixed incomes, class counsel made some
amazing discoveries. The Hanna empire was not a unitary structure at
all. Instead, it was a snake ball of over 100 entities, including partner-
ships, limited partnerships, corporations, and proprietorships. At the
head of it all was Dan Hanna himself, operating the entire empire out of
his hip pocket, as it were, as a sole proprietor.
In each of the four note offerings, Hanna had retained a "Big Six" ac-
counting firm to audit the enterprise. Each of the offering documents
included a "clean letter" from the accountants, opining that the financial
statements had been prepared "in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles" and audited "in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards." Class counsel served a request for production of the
36. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1994).
37. A ubiquitous form of fraud named after Carlo Ponzi (1882-1949), an Italian immi-
grant who built a high interest rate loan scheme from $200 to $15 million by promising and
paying 50% interest in 45 days and by paying his agents 10% commissions. See DONALD
H. DUNN, PONZI!: THE BOSTON SWINDLER (1975).
Ponzi schemes' great failing is that the circle of victims must continuously widen, for new
investors' capital is used to pay the high returns to those who invested previously. At some
point, the swindler will not be able to find sufficient numbers of additional lenders or
investors. It then becomes a matter of time before the bubble bursts. Nonetheless, various
kinds of Ponzi schemes are among the most frequently encountered forms of securities
fraud.
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accountants' work papers. On one of the very first audits, the partner in
charge at the accounting firm had scrawled in large letters on a work
paper, "this client is unauditable." Yet several weeks later the firm issued
the first of the several clean opinion letters previously mentioned.
It is difficult to term a Big Six national accounting firm a "rogue."
However termed, though, after discovery of the partner's scrawl, the ac-
counting firm became the principal target of the securities lawyers repre-
senting the class. Nowadays, though, it may be a wonder to progress that
far because federal courts are giving renewed emphasis to the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure's mandate that "the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. "38
Conservative federal judges interpret the mandate as effectively requir-
ing pleading of evidence. "This [the rule] means the who, what, when,
where, and how: the first paragraph of any newspaper story."'39
In the Hanna car wash empire case, though, at least initially, the law-
yers could not have pleaded the who, what, when, where, and how as to
the accountants. Only after some discovery did the attorneys realize the
tangle of corporations and partnerships that existed, something the ac-
countants never did discover. The attorneys also discovered the impru-
dent notation on the work papers by the accountant in charge. At the
beginning, all the lawyers could have alleged was the positive reported
results and the accounts' clean opinion letter, followed by a complete fi-
nancial collapse. Under the pleading fraud with particularity banner, fed-
eral courts have viewed such res ipsa loquitur approaches to pleading as
"shoot for the moon" pleading. They have dismissed the complaint in
such cases.40
A corollary to pleading fraud with particularity is less liberality by fed-
eral courts on the subject of amendment of pleadings.4 A traditional
approach has been to file a relatively skeletal complaint, fleshing out the
allegations with several successive amended complaints as discovery en-
ables the plaintiff to add details. When the evidence is particularly in the
defendants' control, that may be the only possible approach. In securities
cases today, however, the pleading fraud with particularity requirement
militates against such an approach.4 2 In the Hanna car wash empire case,
the plaintiffs' attorneys may not have been able to flesh out their case
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
39. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 941
(1990).
40. See Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1991). In Romani,
the day after a large race horse breeding partnership had been syndicated, Shearson an-
nounced that a key player and general partner was leaving the enterprise. The plaintiff
thus raised the inference that Shearson must have known of the impending departure but
did not disclose it because disclosure would have impeded the sale of the partnership units.
In the eyes of many federal judges, such "must have known" approaches do not comport
with the requirement that fraud be pleaded with particularity.
41. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so
requires").
42. See, e.g., Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993) (oppro-
brium heaped upon plaintiffs' pleading because, with two amended complaints, he has still
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against the accountants in time under the prevailing federal court ap-
proaches to pleading.
The Hanna case, however, did not arise as a federal court case. Oregon
attorneys have long avoided federal court in securities cases, in part due
to the gradually closing window in the federal arena but more so due to
the liberality of Oregon state law. Thus, the case proceeded in the Circuit
Court of Multonomah, Oregon under the style Barlean v. Black.43
For many attorneys, state securities law has always been preferable
from one standpoint. Most state securities laws provide that a prevailing
plaintiff recovers her attorney's fees.44 In addition, under a handful of
state statutes, including Oregon, the plaintiff need not shoehorn the col-
lateral participant into some notion of expanded seller status under a stat-
ute that renders liable certain named individuals and sellers.45 Oregon
holds liable "every person who participates or materially aids in the sale"
that violates antifraud or registration provisions.46
The provision was construed by Justice Hans Linde in Prince v.
Brydon.47 In Prince, an Idaho attorney had prepared documents, includ-
ing an offering circular, for a mining investment. The attorney knew that
one partner intended to sell units in Oregon but did not do any legal
work on compliance with the Oregon Securities Act. Nonetheless, there
was no evidence in the record that the attorney knew of active wrongdo-
ing of the type found in federal aiding and abetting cases. Disagreeing
with the Oregon Court of Appeals, Justice Linde held there need not be
proof of knowledge of wrongdoing:
Whether one's assistance in the sale is "material" does not depend
on one's knowledge of the facts that make it unlawful; it depends on
the importance of one's personal contribution to the transaction.
Ty ping, reproducing, and delivering sales documents may all be es-
sential to a sale, but they could be performed by anyone; it is a
drafter's knowledge, judgment, and assertions reflected in the con-
tents of the documents that are "material" to the sale.48
Thus, in Oregon, the dividing line has become not knowledge or a strong
inference of knowledge of wrongdoing, but rather ministerial or scriv-
ener's acts versus more substantial functions.
An Oregon defendant can exonerate herself by proof, that, in the exer-
cise of reasonable care, she could not have known "of the existence of the
not linked alleged misleading statements with particular directors of the defendant
corporation).
43. No. 9012-07865 (Cir. Ct. of Multnomah County, Or. 1990).
44. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.930(a) (1994) ("reasonable attorneys' fees");
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2001A (1994 & Supp. 1995) ("taxable court costs and reason-
able attorneys' fees"); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33, § D(7) (Vernon 1964 &
Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(1), 21.20.430(2) (1989 & Supp. 1996) (provi-
sion for a "reasonable attorney's fee").
45. See discussion of broader seller status under state securities law infra part II.C.2.
46. OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (1988 & Supp. 1996). Arizona is the same. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2003 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
47. 764 P.2d 1370 (Or. 1988).
48. Id. at 1371.
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facts on which liability is based."'49 In Prince, however, Justice Linde of-
fered scant consolation to defendants found to have "materially aided a
transaction":
The drafters took pains to make clear that the relevant knowledge is
of "the existence of the facts," not the unlawfulness of a sale. These
provisions may place upon persons ... who materially aid in an un-
lawful sale of securities a substantial burden to exonerate themselves
... but this legislative choice was deliberate ... The defense against
strict liability, in short, was to be a showing of ignorance, ' not the
professional role of the person who renders material aid in the un-
lawful sale.50
Thus, in Oregon, the standard defense tactic, "my client was engaged only
in rendition of customary professional services," will not work.51
Business interests in Oregon lobbied to have the legislature amend the
statute, but these efforts failed.52 Oregon thus remained one of the hand-
ful of jurisdictions in which knowledgeable attorneys continued to turn to
state securities law even before "reform" efforts at the federal level. Of
course, nowadays, after the passage of the Act, and with the tightening by
federal courts, close examination of what state laws offer is an exercise to
be undertaken in every jurisdiction.5 3
C. A ROGUE BANK
Oregon requires a proceeds escrow in every offering conducted pursu-
ant to Oregon securities laws. 54 Such escrows are also important else-
where, commonly utilized in "All or None" or "Part or None" offerings.
In such an offering, if 40 units are not sold ("All or None") or some mini-
mum number less than the whole, say, 25 of 40 units ("Part or None"),
are not sold by a certain date, the escrow agent returns to all investors
their subscription agreements and any payments they have made.55
Proceeds escrow serve a number of functions. They insure, for exam-
ple, that if a critical mass of capital is required for a proposed project, the
project will not go forward unless the critical mass is achieved. Investors
also take solace in the evidence produced that some number of other
persons (25 or 40 in the example above) share their judgment that the
49. OR. REv. STAT. § 59.115(3) (1988 & Supp. 1996).
50. 764 P.2d at 1372.
51. Cf. Hines v. Data Line Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 20 (Wash. 1990) (to hold attorneys
liable in Washington, "'something more' must be shown than performance of the usual
drafting and filing services provided by counsel").
52. See, e.g., Gary M. Berne & Neil Bregenzer, Participant Liability Under the Oregon
Securities Law After Prince v. Brydon, 68 OR. L. REv. 885 (1989) (recounting criticisms
that a "parade of horribles" was likely to ensue from the decision).
53. See discussion infra part II.C.
54. OR. ADMIN. R. 441-65-150(3)(a),(b) (1995) provides, inter alia, that the proceeds
of the sale of securities pursuant to the regulations must be segregated into "fiduciary trust
accounts" and that the escrow's terms must include instructions that the funds are to be
held "for the benefit of investors."
55. The working of these types of offerings was described recently by the Fifth Circuit




A number of older federal court decisions hold that manipulation of a
proceeds escrow is a major sin, actionable under federal securities laws. 57
Proceeds escrows and proper use of them are important in securities
offerings.
Classic Christmas Trees, Inc. ("Classic") and its owners, the Heater
family, saw a downturn ahead in Christmas tree prices.58 Previously, the
Heaters had given a security interest in their trees to Key Bank. Key
Bank was pressing for payment of the indebtedness so secured. Classic's
owners then received a visit from a Michigan promoter who had syndi-
cated several Christmas tree plantations located in that state. The owners
saw an alternative to bankruptcy-syndication. They joined forces with
the Michigan promoter to sell their Christmas tree operation to area
investors.
The offering provided that a proceeds escrow be established. Until
thirty-five units were sold, no funds would be released to Classic's own-
ers. If, by the end of November, the units had not been sold, investors
would also receive their money back.
The Classic offering proved to be a sticky offering. By early August,
only fourteen or so units had been sold, and Key Bank was threatening
foreclosure. An attorney for Classic then arranged for yet a third bank to
transfer into escrow bank funds sufficient for the escrow office to state
that the offer was "fully funded." Over $1 million was transferred-
transferred only in the sense of accounting entries in correspondent ac-
counts that were reversed twenty minutes later. Escrow was broken, the
funds were disbursed, and Key Bank was sent on its way.
The following day the bank officers opened a new escrow. Legitimate
selling commenced anew right where it had left off. The offering still
proved to be sticky. When November 31 arrived, the requisite number of
units still had not been sold. The lawyers and the bank simply extended
the escrow agreement, turning blind eyes to the obvious passage of a criti-
cal deadline.
The Christmas trees were overgrown. They were not marketable for
use in homes with ceilings under twelve feet. Also, as predicted, Christ-
mas tree prices headed downward. Classic Christmas trees folded; inves-
tors lost everything and brought a lawsuit.
56. See Svalberg v. SEC, 876 F.2d 181,183 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("The all-or-nothing provi-
sion serves not only to ensure that the issuing firm has sufficient funds to complete its
project, but also to give investors some reasonable indication that they are paying a fair
market price for their investment.").
57. See, e.g., C.E. Carlson, Inc. v. SEC, 859 F.2d 1429, 1434 (10th Cir. 1988); SEC v.
Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); A. J. White
& Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619, 622-23 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). In addition,
Rule 10B-9 defines manipulation of an all or none offering as a "manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9 (1996).
58. These events are recounted from Ainslie v. Spolyar, No. 8912-17730 (Cir. Ct. of
Multnomah County, Or. 1989), and Ainslie v. First Interstate Bank Or., No. 9009-05735
(Cir. Ct. of Multnomah County, Or. 1990).
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In discovery, plaintiffs' counsel served a request for production on the
escrow bank for files of other securities offering escrows in which the
bank had provided services. The bank showed counsel to a file room,
stating "good luck." Yet counsel found the few proverbial needles in the
haystack.
The bank had acted as escrow agent in five or so failed ornamental
shrubbery farm partnerships. In those partnerships, the promoters and
lawyers had played fast and loose with proceeds escrows as well, and the
bank had permitted them to do so. For example, if at the deadline, an
offering had sold only 20 of 35 units, the bank would allow the promoter
and his family to purchase the remainder of the units. The promoter
would kite checks to do so, repaying the "borrowing" when on the follow-
ing day the bank distributed the proceeds of the escrow to him.
The common link in all of this turned out to be two lawyers, one of
whom was a professor at the local law school. Counsel also found that
the temporary parking of funds in order to break securities proceeds es-
crows had occurred around the country. At least one court had found the
professionals involved liable for use of such "flash loans."'59
Again, the complaint progressed through several amendments to re-
flect what had been learned in discovery. Most importantly, the bank's
previous toleration of, and participation in, manipulation of escrows gave
rise to a strong inference of a pattern, fulfilling RICO's requirement that
predicate acts add up to a "pattern of racketeering activity."
The bank fought every step of the way. They seemed incensed by the
thought that, while the banks' fees for its services were less than a thou-
sand dollars, the bank could be held liable for millions of dollars. Of
course, the reply that anything worth doing is worth doing well, did not sit
well.
The case went to trial. The jury returned a $10 million dollar plus ver-
dict against the bank. The verdict reflected treble damages under RICO
as well as attorneys' fees.
Marching toward trial right behind the Christmas tree case were cases
brought on behalf of investors in the ornamental shrub farm deals that
would have been stillborn but for the bank's toleration of manipulation of
proceeds escrows.60 That manipulation made a mockery out of Oregon's
requirement that all offerings include as an integral part a proceeds
escrow.
As with a national accounting firm, one hesitates to label a major re-
spectable West Coast bank a "rogue." Within the bank, however, operat-
ing with little or no supervision, was a rogue department. The bank
employees in that department consistently got too chummy with the per-
59. See Florida Bar v. Calvo, 630 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1993) (upholding disbarment of
attorney who arranged the flash loan), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 58 (1994).




son over whom they were to be watchdogs, namely, promoters and attor-
neys who did securities transactions.
After the Act, of course, the case would have lost much force. The
RICO allegations would have been dismissed insofar as they relied upon
violations of securities laws as the predicate acts. Yet, this case, too, was
brought in state court, and, under many state "little RICO statutes," vio-
lation of the securities laws remain predicate acts for purposes of civil
suits under 'RICO.61
The proceeds escrow cases illustrate the point that rogue professionals
may be found operating in some unlikely places-in a major bank, at a
national accounting firm, within the offices of a prestigious law firm, or
elsewhere. The elsewhere forms the remainder of this section of the
Article.
D. ROGUES IN OTHER PROFESSIONS
The persons defrauded are not limited to investors in tax shelters or
"get rich quick" schemes. In Tolas v. National Life Insurance Co.,62 a
dental surgeon and his employees chose one of the most conservative
investments possible for their pension plan: annuity contracts adminis-
tered by the National Life Insurance Company of Montpelier, Vermont.
Yet a rogue insurance agent who represented the company cashed in an-
nuity contracts, embezzling $750,000. The Vermont company's employ-
ees provided the money after the receipt of faxed documents. Had they
insisted that the originals reach Montpelier, they easily could have de-
tected that they were forgeries. Yet the insurance company retained
counsel and resisted payment on grounds of contributory negligence. The
surgeon had signed blank documents and checks that the insurance bro-
ker had asked him to execute. The surgeon often did so on Sundays be-
cause he and the rogue agent attended the same church.
Congress and conservative federal judges have now given defense at-
torneys so much ammunition that a pugnacious defendant stands a better
than even chance of winning the most outrageous case, or at least wearing
the plaintiff out and settling the case for much less than 100 cents on the
dollar.
Rogue securities salesmen have always been a problem. Harrison v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 63 illustrates roguery and the difficulty of pros-
ecuting cases these days. Two registered representatives, one a vice-pres-
ident of Dean Witter, convinced over 100 investors that, as large brokers,
the two had advantageous access to special municipal bond trading facili-
ties at Dean Witter. They directed investors, including Harrison, to send
61. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(D)(4)(r) (1989 & Supp. 1995) ("inten-
tional or reckless fraud in the purchase or sale of securities" listed as predicate act); OR.
REv. STAT. § 166.715(6)(a)(A) (1990 & Supp. 1996) (violations of various sections of se-
curities act, including antifraud rule, listed among predicate acts for Oregon RICO).
62. No. C 93-1647 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 24, 1993).
63. 79 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 1996).
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funds and correspondence to them at their private addresses to avoid a
Dean Witter office rule which required that all mail be opened and
checks removed in the cashier's cage.64 Instead of investing in bonds, the
two rogues invested in risky put options. After thirty months and large
trading losses, the Ponzi scheme collapsed.
Dean Witter failed to detect the scheme even though the volume in the
registered representative's trading account was extraordinary, which
should have triggered an inquiry under Dean Witter's own rules. Instead
of monitoring, Dean Witter awarded the two rogues plaques for "their
outstanding broker accomplishments. '65
Harrison lost $3.1 million in this Ponzi scheme operated right out of a
major New York Stock Exchange member firm's branch office. Harrison
sued and Dean Witter resisted all the way. It took Harrison two trips to
the Seventh Circuit and several years to obtain a single cent. Finally,
Judge Wood rejected Dean Witter's contention that "it did not directly or
indirectly induce the acts constituting the violation" of securities law:
There is a sufficient basis in the record ... for a reasonable jury to
conclude that even within a sophisticated, well-known, and reputable
company such as Dean Witter ... there was a total lack of sufficient
diligence, that the supervision was only very casual or grossly indif-
ferent, and that Dean Witter totally ignored the obvious warning
signs. In view of the high monetary stakes and the risks resulting
from sophisticated and contriving minds, mere reliance on published
rules and indifferent or superficial supervision of Kenning and Car-
penter's activities while providing income for Dean Witter could be
viewed by a jury as reckless under the instructions. 66
Because rogue brokers have been encountered so frequently in the se-
curities industry, the SEC has announced a special program which sub-
jects firms that hire or retain rogue brokers to "increased scrutiny" of
their hiring and retention practices. 67.
Eighteen months after the announcement of that program, the SEC
and the Department of Justice held a joint press conference to announce
the indictment of rogue securities brokers in ten different cases around
the country. 68 The cases ranged from defrauding forty-two elderly inves-
tors of $950,000 by selling phony securities to registered representatives
64. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190 (1976) (involved similar facts).
Leston Nay, president of a small Chicago securities firm, ran a Ponzi scheme. By virtue of
Nay's "mail rule," his employees never discovered the scheme. Employees were forbidden
to open mail addressed to Nay personally. As a result, he was able to run the scheme out
of his firm's offices for a great number of years.
65. Harrison, 79 F.3d at 612.
66. Id. at 615.
67. Firms with "Rogue" Brokers May Face Increased Scrutiny, Official Says, 26 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 356 (Mar. 11, 1994) (reporting address by Mark Fitterman, Associ-
ate Director of the SEC Division of Market Regulation, at the Practicing Law Institute
"SEC Speaks" Conference on March 5, 1994).
68. SEC, Justice Announce Indictments of Several "Rogue" Brokers, 27 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1833 (Dec. 1, 1995) (comments of Attorney General Janet Reno and SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt at a news conference on November 30, 1995).
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to outright theft of client funds in amounts up to hundreds of thousands
of dollars without even the pretext of phony securities.69
The question that arises is, after "reform" of the securities laws by Con-
gress and conservative federal judges, what are some efficient, cost-effec-
tive avenues to pursue in seeking civil recoveries on behalf of victims of
rogue professionals such as these?
II. ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL CLASS LITIGATION
UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
A. CAN THE PUTATIVE DEFENDANT BE HELD AS A
PRIMARY VIOLATOR?
Pinter v. Dahl cuts back the reach of Section 12 of the Securities Act
pursuant to sellers and solicitors. Gustafson v. Alloyd further limits its
usefulness. Central Bank eliminates aiding and abetting liability under
Rule 10b-5. Expert observers believe that Central Bank presages an end
to other forms of implied secondary liability such as conspiracy and re-
spondeat superior. Are there means left to hold liable culpable collateral
participants in securities transactions that are proven to have been
fraudulent?
Answering the question first requires a return to principles:
Many defendants are only secondarily present in a transaction.
They will have been engaged in "customary business activities, such
as loaning money, managing a corporation, preparing financial state-
ments, distributing a press release, completing brokerage transac-
tions, or giving legal advice ......
If they are liable, however, collateral participants often are primar-
ily liable under at least one, and often several, theories advanced by
a plaintiff. Many commentators, lawyers, and judges, tend wrongly
to equate collateral participation and the secondary presence associ-
ated with it to so-called secondary liability.
Collateral participants are often alleged to be primarily liable and,
along with primary liability generally, the area of primary liability for
them has constantly expanded over the years.70
Primary liability has expanded at common law. This is seen in the expan-
sion of accountants' liability for negligence to third parties. More re-
cently, the expansion has been evident in other professions such as
lawyers.71 Primary liability has also expanded as a matter of federal se-
curities law. Central Bank itself spoke of the door as being ajar:
69. Some of the acts and practices of attorneys are described in Simon M. Lorne & W.
Hardy Callcott, Administrative Actions Against Lawyers Before the SEC, 50 Bus, LAW.
1293, 1317-26 (1995).
70. Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under the Securities Laws-Charting the
Proper Course, supra note 1, at 329-30 (quoting David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in
Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnifica-
tion, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 632 (1972)).
71. See discussion infra part II.E.
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The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from
liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a
lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or
makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser
or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under
10b-5.72
Federal courts seem to find collateral participants potentially liable as
primary violators in at least three instances: (1) when they themselves
have made misstatements to investors; (2) when they have materially par-
ticipated in misstatements made by others; and (3) when they have had
direct contact with plaintiff investors in circumstances calling for them to
correct misstatements or nondisclosures of which they are aware.
1. Makes a Statement
Courts are taking a broader view of who makes a statement. The tradi-
tional defense was that rendition of an opinion letter by an attorney or
provision of accounting statements by accountants was for the benefit of
the issuer of securities and not the investors.73 Today, with increasing
frequency, courts are recognizing that an opinion letter or accounting
statement speaks directly to investors.74
For example, in Kline v. First Western Government Securities, Inc.,75 the
Third Circuit held that "professionals and others with similar access to
information must disclose data that calls into question the accuracy of an
opinion. ' 76 Thus, it may be an open question how much a professional
can turn a blind eye to what she suspects is incomplete information. But
a professional cannot turn a blind eye toward what she knows is contra-
dictory or impeaching evidence, for that converts the blind eye case to the
false impression one.
Other courts have made this distinction in slightly different terms. An
opinion letter or private placement memorandum does not involve the
good faith rendition of professional services when the professional knows
the truth to be at variance with representations in the document. More-
over, the resulting liability is primary liability that survives Central
Bank.77
72. 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
73. Of course, the linchpin of every such argument is Judge Cardoza's opinion in UI-
tramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (holding professionals liable to
those other than with whom they had a professional relationship would result in "liability
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class").
74. A related concept is the "group published" theory. Those officials of an entity(managing partners, directors, officers) who are actively involved in formulation of the
entity's public pronouncements may be held primarily liable as a member of the group that
spoke in the documents containing the deficient disclosure. See, e.g., Wool v. Tandem
Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987); Morse v. Abbott Labs., 756 F. Supp.
1108, 1111 (N.D. II1. 1991); Steinberg, supra note 27, at 500.
75. 24 F.3d 480 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 613 (1994).
76. Id. at 487.
77. See Walco Inv., Inc. v. Thenen, 881 F. Supp. 1576, 1581-83 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
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2. Participates in a Statement Made by Another
In In re Software Toolworks, Inc.,78 the SEC had suggested that Tool-
works disclose preliminary results for the quarter ending June 30. In let-
ters on July 1 and 4, Toolworks told the SEC that the information was not
available. Deloitte & Touche participated in the drafting of those letters
which it knew to be false because Toolworks had provided Deloitte &
Touche with financial data for that quarter. Judge Cynthia Holcomb Hall
held that, post Central Bank, Deloitte & Touche could be held as a pri-
mary violator:
Despite Central Bank, we nevertheless consider this issue because
the plaintiffs' complaint clearly alleges that Deloitte is primarily lia-
ble .... In fact, the July 1 SEC letter stated that it "was prepared
after extensive review and discussions with ... Deloitte" and actually
referred the SEC to two Deloitte partners for further information.
Similarly, the plaintiffs presented evidence that Deloitte played a sig-
nificant role in drafting and editing the July 4 SEC letter. This evi-
dence is sufficient to sustain a primary cause of action under section
10(b) and, as a result, Central Bank does not absolve Deloitte on
these issues.79
In other words, if a collateral participant plays "a significant role" in
drafting a document promulgated by another, knowing the document to
be false or deliberately misleading, the collateral participant may be held
liable as a primary violator. Accountants, for example, have been held
liable as primary violators when they participated in preparation of a
false prospectus issued by another 8° or permitted an auditing client to
issue financial statements the accountants allegedly knew to be false.
8
'
3. Has Direct Contacts with the Plaintiffs or Members of the
Plaintiff Class
The Sixth Circuit evolved the "direct contacts" test of primary liabil-
ity.82 The test seems to graft "direct contacts" onto the test for primary
liability prevailing elsewhere, that is, that the collateral participant partic-
ipated in drafting or revising documents he knew to be false or deliber-
ately misleading. Thus, for example, those who are deemed to have
"furnished documents" to investors may be held primarily liable. 83
Direct contact with investors seems an appropriate addition to the test
of primary liability. Direct contact provides an occasion upon which
78. 38 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1994).
79. Id. at 1090 n.3.
80. See Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 887 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Il. 1995).
81. See Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
82. See Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 917-18 (6th Cir. 1991)
(Utah attorney who implemented a going public by the back door scheme and participated
in drafting various fraudulent documents).
83. SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 223-24 (6th Cir. 1982); Stein-
berg, supra note 27, at 500-01.
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events call for the collateral participant to disclose substantial misgivings
she has about the issuer's disclosures.
The Western District of Michigan held liable an attorney and law firm
whose work for, and involvement in, a corporation far exceeded the
"daily grist of the mill."84 The court summarized the Sixth Circuit law on
the subject, noting that "direct contacts ... may include direct dealing
with the 'other side'-in this case, direct dealing with the purchasers of
Rospatch stock."' 85 The court went on also to conclude that "direct par-
ticipation in preparation of documents constitutes 'direct contacts' under
the law of the Sixth Circuit." 86
B. BRING ANY FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDING AS AN INDIVIDUAL OR
GROUP RATHER THAN CLASS ACTION
Following the amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in
1966, the class action boomed.87 Another driving force behind the boom
was the attorney's fee that could be obtained in class actions, often a sub-
stantial percentage of the recovery, based upon "common fund"
grounds.88
In the late 1970s, however, courts began severely to criticize fee awards
in class action cases.8 9 The lodestar method, based upon the number of
attorney hours billed multiplied by the usual hourly rate (the lodestar)
with a modest multiplier, such as, 1.3, applied to that sum,90 overtook the
percentage of recovery as the method of choice in approving fee awards
in class action cases.91 The prevalence of the lodestar method may have
meant lower fees. It also required the expenditure of a substantial
amount of time in every case, whether needed or not, and awarded noth-
ing to compensate class counsel for cases in which little or no fee had
been obtained.
As a result of the lodestar method and general forfeiture of control to
the judge in class actions, a common tactic in the early 1980s became to
litigate securities cases as individual actions on behalf of as many named
plaintiffs who would join suit. A one-third contingent fee in representing
84. The phrase originates in Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 463 (8th Cir. 1991).
85. In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,939 at
93,978 (W.D. Mich. July 8, 1992).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REv. 664, 665, 669-76 (1979).
88. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (attorney's fee from com-
mon fund approved as a matter of general equity jurisprudence in the United States).
89. The cases marking a first turning to the lodestar method are Lindy Bros. Builders,
Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 166-68 (3rd Cir. 1973),
appeal after remand, 540 F.2d 102 (3rd. Cir. 1976); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495
F.2d 448, 469-71 (2d Cir. 1974).
90. For a summary of the process of calculation, see DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE 11.41, at 722-23 (1993).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) mandates that "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court." A substantial part of that approval pro-
cess involves examination of class counsel's proposed fee.
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one-half of the investors was preferable to the 8%, 19%, or 12% of the
recovery the lodestar might yield in a class action. Moreover, the individ-
ual or group action did not present the same opportunity for intervenors,
and their counsel, to opt in, often to seek a share of the fee. In the 1980s,
many of the limited partnership and other tax shelter cases were litigated
in this way, that is, as actions on behalf of numbers of named plaintiffs (30
to 40, 70 to 80) rather than as class actions.
Most recently, the percentage of recovery method has become preva-
lent again.92 With it came a reprise of the class action and the demise of
the action on behalf of numerous named plaintiffs (the group action).
The last twist and turn in the story is the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (the "Reform Act of 1995"). 9 3 As a result of the
Reform Act of 1995, it seems wise to avoid class litigation in the securities
area and to reprise again the group action when that alternative seems
feasible.
The Reform Act of 1995 does many bad things to class actions, only a
few of which need be mentioned here.94 One negative for plaintiff's
counsel is the mandatory quest in class actions for "the most adequate
plaintiff" ("MAP") and the upset provision once she is found. Within
twenty days of filing a class action complaint, plaintiff's counsel must pub-
lish a notice of the pendency of the action "in a widely circulated national
business-oriented publication, or wire service." 95 Within the ensuing
ninety days, the court must entertain motions by any purported class
members to take over as lead plaintiff. In that process, the court must
presume that the movant "with the largest financial interest in the relief
sought" is the MAP.96 If the presumption is not overturned, an upset
takes place. The MAP "upsets" the named plaintiff as lead plaintiff and
92. One of the most vocal criticisms of the lodestar method was by Judge Marilyn
Patel in In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (approving a
return to a percentage of the recovery attorney fee formula):
Is this [lodestar] process necessary? Under a cost-benefit analysis, the an-
swer would be a resounding "No!" Not only do the Lindy and Kerr-Johnson
analyses consume an undue amount of court time.., but, in fact, it may be to
the detriment of the class members. They are forced to wait until the court
has done a thorough, conscientious analysis of the attorneys' fee petition.
[C]lass members may suffer a further diminution of their fund when a special
master is returned and paid from the fund .... Where attorneys must de-
pend on a lodestar approach there is little incentive to arrive at an early
settlement.
In some circuits, a 25% fee has become presumptive in the settlement of securities and
corporate class actions. See, e.g., In re Pacific Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir.
1995) ("twenty-five percent is the 'benchmark' that district courts should award in common
fund cases" but awarding 33% "because of the complexity of the issues and risks"). But see
In re Boesky Sec. Litig., 888 F. Supp. 551, 559-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (district judge view that
lodestar is mandatory in the Second Circuit).
93. See Reform Act, supra note 8.
94. See Branson, supra note 10, for a more complete list, including the efforts to eradi-
cate professional plaintiffs.
95. See Reform Act, supra note 8, § 101(a).
96. Id.
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her counsel becomes lead counsel. 97
One stratagem in class actions could be a maintenance by the defense
bar of a stable of "sweetheart plaintiffs." The best sweetheart plaintiffs
would own a substantial number of shares (1000 or 5000) in order to as-
sure a greater likelihood of success in the quest to upset the named plain-
tiff. As MAP, the sweetheart plaintiff and her counsel would be disposed
to reach a quick and easy disposition of the litigation.
The upset provisions, and their use either by defense lawyers or rival
plaintiffs' attorneys attempting to muscle in on the action, are alone
enough to drive class counsel back to the group action in cases in which it
is feasible. In terms of fees, those attorneys may give up more than in
times when the lodestar method was prevalent and courts were skeptical
of fee awards.
A makeweight may be that, paradoxically, without a class component
to litigation, an attorney may be able to obtain a fee from a corporate
defendant based upon common benefit or corporate therapeutics grounds
while the Reform Act of 1995 prohibits such an award in a securities class
action. The Reform Act of 1995 limits the fee award to class counsel to a
percentage of "amounts actually paid," presumably to rule out fee shift-
ing based upon "corporate therapeutics" or cosmetic relief in federal se-
curities class actions.98
Yet the most authoritative corporate court in the land, the Supreme
Court of Delaware, has held that a class or derivative action component is
not a necessary prerequisite to a fee award on common benefit grounds.
"We hold," the court has stated, "that, under certain circumstances, coun-
sel fees may be awarded to an individual shareholder whose litigation
effort confers a benefit upon the corporation, or its shareholders notwith-
standing the absence of a class or derivative component." 99 The focus is
on the benefit shared by others, not upon the form of the action.
More than ever, the class action is to be avoided in federal securities
cases. A somewhat imperfect substitute is the group action. A less im-
perfect substitute may be a group action with a common benefit or corpo-
rate therapeutics component.
C. TURN TO STATE SECURITIES LAWS
There are several advantages and two disadvantages to the state securi-
ties laws.
97. See id. (amending 15 U.S.C. § 772-1) ("The most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to
the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.").
98. Id. ("Total attorneys' fees and expenses awarded by the court to counsel for the
plaintiff class shall not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and
prejudgment interest actually paid the class.").
99. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Del. 1989).
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1. Availability of Attorney's Fees
In cases arising under federal securities laws, plaintiff's counsel looks
primarily to any common fund created for his fee, which lessens the net
recovery for investors. Only if there also exists a common benefit, or
corporate therapeutics component to the case, will any portion of the fee
be shifted to the defendant. By contrast, as has been seen, 00 most state
securities laws provide for fee shifting. Plaintiff investors receive a full
recovery and the losing defendant must pay the investors' attorney's fees.
2. Broader Seller Status
Thirty-seven jurisdictions have adopted the 1956 version of the Uni-
form Securities Act. 101 Six jurisdictions have adopted the revised 1985
Uniform Securities Act, three being states that had the prior act and up-
graded to the newer version.10 2 Three of the six, though, do represent
new adoptions. Thus, the Uniform Securities Act is the law of forty juris-
dictions. Of the remaining states, several, including New York and Cali-
fornia, have home grown statutes that are beyond the scope of a
symposium article.' 0 3
The civil liability provision of the 1956 Uniform Act provides that
"[a]ny person who ... offers or sells a security in violation of [registration
requirements] ... is liable to the person buying the security from him."'10 4
The seller or offeror is also liable if he "offers or sells a security by means
of an untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a mate-
rial fact."'1 5 The question that arises is how expansive are the terms
"seller," and "any person who offers or sells." The few authorities that
have examined the question are split. Some hold that state law notions of
who is a seller are broader than at least the point of sale analysis of Pinter
v. Dahl. Other state courts have followed Pinter v. Dahl in determining
the scope of the term "seller."
In the latter category are several state intermediate appellate courts as
well as a handful of federal courts making educated Erie guesses as to
state law. 106
100. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
101. See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT, 7B U.L.A. 509 (1985).
102. See id. 1995 Supplement at 87 (Table regarding adoption of 1995 revised act); see
generally HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 359 (1985).
103. They are perhaps also beside the point. New York courts have refused to imply a
private right of action pursuant to New York's Martin Act. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. McKes-
son Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 118 (N.Y. 1987); Independent Order of Foresters v. Donaldson,
919 F. Supp. 149, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). California's statute is of greater but nonetheless
limited use to plaintiffs because of strict privity and high state of mind requirements. See,
e.g., In re ZZZZ Best, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,981, at 73,838 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Lubin
v. Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425, 1453 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
104. UNIFORM SECURrrIES ACT § 410(a)(1), 7B U.L.A. 643 (1985).
105. Id. § 410(a)(2).
106. See State v. Williams, 390 S.E.2d 746, 749 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (applying Dahl to
reverse attorney's securities fraud conviction); Zendell v. Newport Oil Corp., 544 A.2d 878,
882 (N.J. App. 1988) (adopting Dahl sale-solicitation as the test of expanded seller status);
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By contrast, the supreme courts of two leading Blue Sky states, Kansas
and Washington, have consciously chosen to take a different fork in the
road. Those two courts have retained the pre-Pinter v. Dahl "substantial
factor" test of expanded seller. The Supreme Court of Kansas noted that
"although the same terms are used in the federal and state statutes ... ,
the basic framework in which the statutes are formulated shows a differ-
ent approach should be employed."10 7
In Washington, the supreme court first read Pinter v. Dahl incorrectly,
conceiving it as evolving an ultra narrow "strict privity analysis of the
term 'seller.""' 108 For that reason, the court rejected it. The Washington
court noted that "the Supreme Court's construction of a similarly worded
federal statute, although often persuasive, 'is not controlling on our inter-
pretation of a state statute." '10 9 The court also decided that the Washing-
ton statute is to be construed more broadly than the federal statute, in
part because state securities laws place more emphasis on protection of
investors while the federal scheme is more intent on protection of the
"integrity of the marketplace." ' 10 Utilizing "substantial contributive fac-
tor" and "substantial factor-proximate cause" tests of who is a seller,"'
the court decided that allegations against the state auditor, who had certi-
fied certain aspects of a bond offering, required more development at the
trial court level. 12
Thus, states now seem to be falling on one of two sides of a great di-
vide. One group of state judiciaries pays great heed to Section 415 of the
Uniform Securities Act which admonishes that "[tihis act shall be so con-
strued as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and ad-
ministration of this act with the related federal regulation."'1 3 That
group regards as nearly dispositive what the federal courts have done.
The other group regards as more dispositive what other states have
done and the differing purpose served by state regulation. One of those
courts has found, for example, that the Uniform Securities Act provision
does not require "imitation" of the federal scheme. 14 The Supreme
Court of Utah recently held that "[u]niformity with a significant majority
Allen v. Columbia Fin. Management Ltd., 377 S.E.2d 352,356 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (applies
Dahl). Accord, Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1115 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying
Dahl as law of Louisiana), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473,
478 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying Dahl as Connecticut law).
107. State ex rel. Mays v. Ridenhour, 811 P.2d 1220, 1230 (Kan. 1991) (upholding in-
junction against promoters of pyramid sales scheme despite their lack of participation in
sales efforts).
108. Hoffer v. State, 776 P.2d 963, 964 (Wash. 1989).
109. Id. (quoting State v. Gore, 681 P.2d 227 (1984)).
110. Id. at 965 (relying on Haberman V. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d
1032, 1049 (Wash. 1987)).
111. Hoffer v. State, 755 P.2d 781, 789 (Wash. 1988).
112. The contributive factor test was revisited and again upheld in Hines, 787 P.2d at 20
n.8.
113. UNIFORM SECURITIEs Acr § 415, 7B U.L.A. 678 (1985).
114. Kittilson v. Ford, 608 P.2d 264, 265 (Wash. 1980).
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of states," rather than allegiance to federal precedent, is its goal in con-
struction of the Utah version of the Uniform Securities Act. 115 Pre-
Pinter, the Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that in the matter of
determining who is a seller, and on other issues as well, "the Alabama
Act goes beyond the federal act.""16 Then, too, there exists a group of
state legislatures that chose never to adopt Uniform Securities Act Sec-
tion 415 in the first place." 7
The great divide among states may become more pronounced. Com-
mentators have suggested that states need not pay the deference that they
have paid in the past to federal court decisions. A suggested point of
departure has been the Supreme Court's excessively literal approach to
statutory construction in the securities as well as other areas, an approach
much less compelling for state courts." 8
Likely to push state and federal regulation apart still more is the Fields
legislation, now pending in the Congress. Over the objection of state reg-
ulators, Congress is soon to preempt the field in important areas such as
regulation of mutual fund offerings and offerings of mid-size and larger
public corporations." 9 The legislation may cause state securities regula-
tors to disregard federal court positions on many issues.
Depending upon the jurisdiction, state securities regulation may enable
a plaintiff's attorney to cast a wider net in naming and holding liable col-
lateral participants through broader state law notions of who is a seller.
But that is not the only avenue state securities law offers.
3. Express (but Limited) Aiding and Abetting Liability
Another subsection of the Uniform Securities Act civil liability provi-
sion deals with persons other than sellers who may be held liable. The
section is thus a modest express aiding and abetting provision that may
include some, but not all, categories of frequently named collateral
participants:
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable [for
registration violations], every partner, officer, or director of such a
seller, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar
functions, every employee of such seller who materially aids in the
sale ... [is] liable ... unless the non-seller who is so liable sustains
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in [the] exercise of
reasonable care could not have know, of the existence of facts by
115. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1360 (Utah 1993).
116. Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Sec. Co. Inc., 482 So. 2d 1201, 1207 (Ala. 1986).
117. For example, of the Pacific Rim states, Alaska, Hawaii, and Oregon never adopted
the provision. See Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws,
supra note 1, at 1050, 1051 n.138.
118. See generally Douglas M. Branson & Karl S. Okamoto, The Supreme Court's Liter-
alism and the Definition of "Security" in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043
(1993).
119. See, e.g., Mark Anderson, House Plans to Vote on Bill to Revise Securities Laws,
WALL ST. J., June 17, 1996, at C-19; Securities Regulation Bill Advances, N.Y. TIMES, June
19, 1996, at D-1.
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reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. 120
Under the South Carolina version of the statute, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina listed four categories of potential defendants: (1) part-
ners, officers, or directors (and de facto equivalents); (2) employees of
the seller; (3) agents of the seller; (4) a broker dealer. 121 A common leg-
islative embellishment is to add the latter two categories.
Several states have broadened the provision considerably more by re-
vising the list to include a catchall term. Oregon also holds liable "every
person who participates or materially aids in the sale," regardless of
whether they are a director, officer, employee, or the like,122 which can
be read as broad express aiding and abetting liability. In Arizona, "[a]n
action... may be brought against any person.., who made, participated
in or induced the unlawful sale or purchase."'1 23 Texas, too, broadens the
provision's coverage but includes an additional scienter requirement,
holding liable "[a] person who directly or indirectly with intent to deceive
or defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law materially
aids a seller, buyer, or issuer."'1 24
A more common addition to the list is "every broker, dealer or agent
who materially aids in the sale.' 25 A means of further expansion of that
type of provision is to shoehorn collateral participants who have aided
the selling effort in some way into the term "agent" or "employee." In
Washington, a federal judge refused to dismiss allegations against a na-
tional accounting firm that had certified financial statements of a failed
oil and gas venture. The Court noted that "[u]nder these allegations An-
derson could be considered an employee of the seller of the securities
who materially aided the sales transaction. ' 126 State courts have differed
on whether an attorney could have employee status.127 An older Hawai-
ian decision takes a broad view of when agents will be liable under the
Hawaiian version of the Uniform Securities Act.128
120. UNIFORM SECURITIES Acr § 410(b), 7B U.L.A. 643 (1985).
121. Atlanta Skin & Cancer Clinic, P.C. v. Hallmark Gen. Partners, 463 S.E.2d 600, 603
(S.C. 1995).
122. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59.115(3) (1988 & Supp. 1996); see discussion supra notes
42-52 and accompanying text.
123. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2003 (1994 & Supp. 1995). The statute has been ap-
plied to hold liable a business broker who omitted material information, Strom v. Black,
523 P.2d 1339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974), and an attorney who acted as a go-between in a stock
sale, Trump v. Badet, 327 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Ariz. 1958).
124. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5811-330F(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
125. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.930(c) (1994).
126. Ackerman, Jablonski, Porterfield & De Tre v. Alhadeff, [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J 92,756, at 93,685 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 16, 1986).
127. Compare Pottle v. Coffey, Blue Sky Law Rep. (CCH) $ 73,226, at 74,449 (Alaska
1990) (attorney could be employee) with Allen v. Columbia Fin. Management Ltd., 377
S.E.2d 352, 356-57 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (attorney could not be held as employee) and
Rendler v. Markos, 454 N.W.2d 805 (Wis. App. 1990) ("agent" does not include attorney
rendering legal advice or drafting documents).
128. See Young v. Kwock, 474 P.2d 285, 287 (Haw. 1970).
[A] corporation, bereft of both body and mind, can operate only through
agents, and it is the agents who knowingly aid the illegal transaction that arejointly and severally liable.
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A discerning analysis of when an attorney or other collateral partici-
pant becomes an agent "who materially aids in the sale or purchase" is by
the Supreme Court of Indiana in Johnson v. Colip.129 The court reversed
dismissal of the attorney defendant under its umbrella test that a collat-
eral participant is an agent "if his or her affirmative conduct or failure to
act when reasonably expected to do so at a meeting of prospective inves-
tors made it more likely than not that the investors would purchase the
securities.' 130 Justice Sullivan then gave examples of when an attorney
would become an agent and when he would not:
For example, if when called upon at the meetings, Colip primarily
reassured investors that risks about which they expressed concern
were unlikely to materialize, such behavior made it more likely than
not that the investors would purchase . . . On the other hand, if
Colip's principal function at the meeting was to either temper the
exuberance of the principal promoters (a frequent reason why law-
yers are asked to accompany "road shows" promoting new securities'
offerings) or to discuss the technical aspects of the partnership agree-
ment.., we think the facts are not susceptible to an inference that an
attempt to effect the purchase or sale of a security occurred.' 3 '
The express aiding and abetting provision of the Uniform Securities
Act may offer additional means by which to hold a rogue professional
accountable. The language "materially aid in the sale," though, cuts the
provision back and to a degree overlaps it with broadened seller status.
For that and other reasons, then, the Uniform Securities Act's express
aiding and abetting provision does not approach the elasticity of common
law aiding and abetting.
4. Lower State of Mind Requirements
Under federal securities law, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder requires a
plaintiff to prove at least reckless of the conscious disregard to ground a
damage recovery. 32 One of the decision's reasons was that, although on
its face Rule 10b-5 has no state of mind requirement at all, Rule 10b-5
can be no broader than the statute pursuant to which the rule was en-
acted. The statute uses the words "manipulative," "deceptive," and "con-
trivance." Justice Powell found special significance in "manipulative" as
"a term of art" denoting "intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors.' 33 State law versions of Rule 10b-5, how-
[Defendant] argues that "aids" means inducing the purchaser to buy and
that the facts indicate that she took no part in the "selling" effort .... [S]ome
jurisdictions have followed such reasoning ... [but under Hawaii's statute]
not merely the salesmen who induced the purchase but all officers, directors
and agents who in any way contributed to the disposition of the securities are
liable.
Id.
129. 658 N.E.2d 575, 576 (Ind. 1995).
130. Id. at 578.
131. Id. at 578-79.
132. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
133. Id. at 199.
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ever, containing the nearly no-fault language, were enacted by legisla-
tures. The Hochfelder analysis does not apply. Under the Uniform
Securities Act, then, damages can lie for negligent behavior.
For example, in Kittilson v. Ford,134 the Washington Supreme Court
regarded the similarity in language but difference in source as deciding
the question: "[I]n contrast to the federal scheme, the language of Rule
lOb-5 is not derivative but is the statute in Washington.' 135 So many state
courts have now decided the issue in the same way that the question may
be said to be no longer an open one. 136 Allegations of mere lack of rea-
sonable care will suffice under state laws, although the wisdom of pro-
ceeding against a collateral participant merely on such grounds may be
questioned. 137
5. Disadvantage: No Implied Secondary (Aiding and Abetting)
Liability
Post Central Bank, at least two state supreme courts have confronted
arguments that broad aiding and abetting liability should be implied
under their states' versions of the Uniform Securities Act.138 Both courts
have turned back the argument. The Connecticut Supreme Court re-
garded as important the fact that at the time of the Uniform Securities
Act's approval and first adoption by states, federal courts had yet to im-
ply aiding and abetting liability under the parallel federal antifraud rule,
Rule 10b-5.139 The first federal aiding and abetting decision, Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.,140 was not published until 1966.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina thought that the Uniform Secur-
ities Act's provision of express (albeit limited) aiding and abetting liabil-
134. 608 P.2d 264 (Wash. 1980).
135. Id. at 265.
136. See, e.g., State v. Shama Resources, Ltd. Partnership, 899 P.2d 977, 982 (Idaho
1995) (Department of Finance "was not required to make a showing of scienter"); State v.
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1359-60 (Utah 1993) ("Uniformity with a significant majority of
states is achieved only by a 'no scienter' construction of the provision"); Branson, Collat-
eral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws, supra note 1, at 1046 nn. 112-14 (col-
lecting pre-1992 cases).
137. See the conclusion in Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securi-
ties Laws, supra note 1, at 1066:
The low and across-the-board negligence state of mind standard in Uniform
Securities Act jurisdictions may be a delusion rather than a benefit. Judges
are loath to find liable, for mere lack of reasonable care, collateral partici-
pants in securities transactions. So judges, especially federal judges review-
ing Erie or pendant state securities act claims, tend to [act in ways inimical to
plaintiffs].
138. See Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Giacomi, 659 A.2d 1166,1177 (Conn. 1995); Atlanta
Skin, 463 S.E.2d at 601.
139. See Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 659 A.2d at 1174, 1177 ("We hesitate to recognize
greater liability under CUSA than that provided under federal securities law at the time
that the Uniform Act was drafted, especially where CUSA expressly delineates secondary
forms of liability such as aider and abettor liability.").
140. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
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ity precluded also implying aiding and abetting liability.141 Making
educated Erie guesses about state securities laws, federal judges are com-
ing to the same conclusion. 142 There seem to be no recent decisions to
the contrary, implying broader secondary civil liability as a matter of state
securities law.
6. Disadvantage: No Implied Cause of Action Under the General
Antifraud Rule
Plaintiffs have sought to escape the constraints of the express aider and
abettor list in Section 410 of the Uniform Securities Act by arguing parity
with the federal scheme. That is, they have argued that, since under Rule
10b-5 federal courts have implied a right of action, under Section 100 of
the Uniform Securities Act state courts should imply a cause of action.
Plaintiffs do so, however, as a means to an end. The end sought then is
further implication and overlaying of implied aider and abettor liability
on statutory state antifraud rules. Thus, the court decisions discussed in
the previous subsection are indirect holdings that no implied right of ac-
tion exists. Under the Uniform Securities Act, all civil liability flows from
the express civil liability provision, Section 415, although the underlying
substantive offense may be grounded on any of a number of the Act's
substantive commands (antifraud rule, registration requirements, broker
dealer registration provisions, and so on).
Very few decisions have directly confronted the implication of a private
right of action under state antifraud statues.143 The question is a complex
one, with a number of arguments for and against, 144 and beyond the
scope of this symposium piece. Suffice it to say that the tide runs rela-
tively strongly against any such implication of a private right of action, as
it does against implying aider and abettor secondary liability.
D. TURN TO STATE CORPORATE LAW
Although no implied aiding and abetting liability may exist under state
securities law, aiding and abetting liability is alive and well as a matter of
state corporation law. The area has received little summary or analysis by
commentators 45 but is well recognized by a number of courts.
In an early decision, the Delaware Chancellor held that:
141. See Atlanta Skin, 463 S.E.2d at 604 ("the very existence of an express 'materially
aids' civil remedy in § 35-1-1500 implicitly undermines the notion of an implied cause of
action"). The Connecticut Supreme Court also relied on this ground. See Connecticut
Nat'l Bank, 659 A.2d at 1177.
142. See, e.g., Broadview Fin., Inc. v. Entech Management Servs. Corp., 859 F. Supp.
444, 453 (D. Colo. 1994).
143. An exception is Naye v. Boyd, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 92,980 (W.D. Wash. Oct.
20, 1986) (finding no implied action to exist).
144. Some of those arguments are summarized in Branson, Collateral Participant Lia-
bility Under State Securities Laws, supra note 1, at 1062-66.
145. Butsee DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 10.09, 10.10 (1993).
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The legal theory [of aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty]
is sound. The directors of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relation-
ship... [a]nd one who knowingly joins with any fiduciary, including
corporate officials, in a breach of his obligation is liable to the bene-
ficiaries of the trust relationship. 146
In Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Tuckman,147 the
Supreme Court of Delaware placed its imprimatur on the concept, stating
that "if outside experts, on whom many must depend for the integrity of
corporate affairs, knowingly conspire with self-dealing fiduciaries to de-
fraud those very persons who in practicality must rely on their advice, it is
difficult to see why the same trust principles of Bovay should not ap-
ply."' 148 The court thus held that not only could outside accountants be
held liable but that the only applicable time bar was laches and not the
shorter statute of limitations. Very recently, the theory that an attorney
could be held liable for aiding and abetting violations of fiduciary duty
was accepted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 149
Many securities fraud cases involve self dealing or outright theft by
partners, general partners, corporate officers, or promoters, all of whom
are fiduciaries under state law. Often, their defalcations or acts of self-
dealing are assisted by collateral participants who know of the wrongdo-
ing and turn a blind eye, or even aid in creating a false appearance or
impression. Aiding and abetting under states' corporate or partnership
laws thus becomes a useful and, indeed, valuable tool. The questions that
remain are two: (1) does Central Bank potentially undermine aiding and
abetting under state law as well?; and (2) what are the disadvantages of
the theory?
As to the first question, Central Bank rejects the graft of a common law
concept, aiding and abetting, onto express or implied statutory liability.
Hence, the antidote to Central Bank is that state corporate fiduciary law
is wholly common law in origin. Central Bank's reasoning is inapposite.
It is fitting that the state fiduciary law's gaps be filled by other well-
known common law theories and devices.
The greater obstacle may be that any action to vindicate a breach of
fiduciary duty is derivative, because at least in the corporate setting, the
duty owed is to the corporation rather than to the investors. An action
for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty could thus be conceived
of as derivative as well. As such, the action may be sidetracked or de-
railed altogether by use of the special litigation committee device. Even
if the action is not derailed, the recovery, if any, would go to the corpo-
rate treasury rather than to the investors. Of course, in the passage
quoted from the Delaware Chancellor's opinion, the Chancellor expressly
146. Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972).
147. 372 A.2d 168 (Del. 1976).
148. Id. at 170.
149. See Alleco v. Weinberg Found., 665 A.2d 1038, 1049 (Md. 1995) ("Aider and abet-
tor tort liability... has been uniformly recognized .... Finding, however, that there had
been no underlying primary violation for the defendant attorney to aid and abet.).
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stated that the aider and abettor "is liable to the beneficiaries of the trust
relationship."150
E. TURN TO THE COMMON LAW OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
The liability to third parties of makers of a statement negligently made
is a subject worthy of an entire treatise and one has recently been pub-
lished on that subject. 151 Historically, courts have lead the way in finding
accountants liable to third parties who have relied upon financial state-
ments certified or compiled by those accountants. By contrast, other cat-
egories of professionals, including most notably lawyers, have been
relatively immune from such liability. 152
Today, however, no profession is immune from such liability, although
the extent of the liability may vary among jurisdictions. 53 Even attor-
neys who recklessly render opinion letters upon which third party inves-
tors rely, or who prepare private placement memoranda or other
disclosure documents, knowing them to be materially false, are being
held liable to third parties. 54 Liability can extend to appraisers of assets,
150. See supra text accompanying note 148.
151. See JAY M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF PROFESSIONALS
AND BUSINESSES TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC Loss (1995).
152. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The Third-
Party Liability of Accountants and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1309 (1991); Nancy Lewis, Lawyers' Liability to Third Parties: The Ideology of Advo-
cacy Refrained, 66 OR. L. REV. 801 (1987).
153. The two main competing positions are liability to all foreseeable third parties, as in
much of tort law, or more limited liability to a "person or one of a limited group of persons
for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (1976)
("Information Negligently Supplied For the Guidance of Others"). See generally
FEINMAN, supra note 151, at 131-48.
Among the accountant cases, the following posit liability to all foreseeable third parties:
Brumley v. Touche, Ross & Co., 463 N.E.2d 195, 200 (I11. App. Ct. 1984); Bonhiver v.
Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291, 298 (Minn. 1976); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 153
(N.J. 1983); and Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Wis.
1983).
Authorities adopting the Restatement position include Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834
P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); First Florida Bank, N.A., v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
1990); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander
Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1982); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert &
Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436
N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1982); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Ft. Worth 1971, writ refd n.r.e.); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah
1974); and First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989).
154. The Supreme Court of Colorado recently applied RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 552 to attorneys who prepared opinion letters in connection with a securities of-
fering. Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Central Bank, 892 P.2d 230, 236-37 (Colo.
1995). Other courts have held attorneys liable to third party investors based upon lack of
care in preparation of opinion letters upon which they knew investors would rely. See, e.g.,
Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff investors allowed to
reach tax lawyer who rendered opinion because "Indiana does not apply a privity rule in
fraud cases"); Horizon Fin. v. Hansen, 791 F. Supp. 1561 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (attorney's opin-
ion letter could support liability to third party under either Georgia or Pennsylvania law).
See generally Lawson & Mattison, supra note 152, at 1341 ("the line between the third
party liability of attorneys and accountants may be much narrower than a simple nose
count of jurisdictions presently suggests").
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investment bankers who render fairness opinions, celebrity spokesper-
sons who aid in the sale of recreational real estate or investment schemes,
and many other professionals.
With regard to liability to third parties for negligent misrepresentation,
after Central Bank and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, the conclusion I reached in 1992 after examining the maze of state
securities law seems more apropos than ever:
The future may then come full circle. Plaintiffs in states in which
the courts take a restrictive attitude (toward the scope of state secur-
ities law) will rely increasingly upon claims of simple negligence
against collateral participants in securities transactions. Those plain-
tiffs will attempt to slip the bounds of a common law privity require-
ment by analogy to the accountant cases. In a good many
jurisdictions, courts have held accountants liable to third parties with
whom they have not dealt if the third party was foreseeable, or at
least a member of a foreseeable class .... A great deal of uncer-
tainty, and some seemingly intractable questions, seem to persist in
the area of state securities laws. The way out of the maze may be
old, true and tried common law cases and methods. 155
III. CONCLUSION
Nothing that Congress or the federal courts have done changes one
central element in the equation. That element is that whenever and
wherever other people's money is sought, the presence of rogues is likely,
if not on center stage then in the shadows. The methods by which those
rogues may be held accountable to defrauded investors have been vastly
reduced by somewhat naive legislators and judges who seem to have little
inkling of the realities of the securities business.
Be that as it may, the practical conclusion one reaches is that, except in
an action against a solvent issuer, or a collateral participant who has actu-
ally participated in making a fraudulent statement to investors, by named
plaintiffs, a strong bias now exists against filing a securities lawsuit in our
federal courts. The avenue plaintiffs' attorneys contemplating other types
of actions may find necessary to take include state securities law and
common law actions, filed in state court.
Thus, it is that the world has now turned upside down. The traditional
destination for large complex pieces of civil litigation, our capable and at
times majestic federal courts, will now receive the smaller cases. After
sixty some years under the federal securities laws, the safer haven for
many complex civil cases or cases involving egregious types of the very
kind those statutes were intended to prevent or remedy, has become the
state court of general jurisdiction.
155. Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws, supra note 1,
at 1066-67.
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